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The Rehabilitation of Low-Income
Rental Housing: A Look at the
Section 167(k) Program and
the Direct Subsidy
Alternative
Janet R. Spragens*
Section 167(k) of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted in 1969 to
stimulate the rehabilitation of low-income rental housing, particularly in the
inner cities. Despite wavering support by the federal government and criti-
cism by leading commentators, the program has shown some success. The
author examines the tax subsidy approach of section 167(k) and compares it
to a direct subsidy alternative, concluding that despite its shortcomings, the
tax incentive approach of section 167(k) provides unique advantages as a
method to stimulate housing rehabilitation.
SECTION 167(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, first enacted as part
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969,1 permits the owner of low-income
rental housing to write off rehabilitation expenditures as depreciation
deductions on an accelerated sixty-month schedule. 2 The broad pur-
pose of section 167(k) is to stimulate rehabilitation of the large stock of
generally dilapidated housing in the inner cities through tax incen-
tives. 3 Rehabilitation of existing housing is generally viewed as being
* B.A., (1964), Wellesley College; M.A.T., (1965), Northwestern University; J.D.
(1968), George Washington University. The author is Professor of Law, American
University, Washington College of Law. She is admitted to the District of Columbia Bar.
1. Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 521(a), 83 Stat. 649 (1969).
2. Initially enacted for a term of five years (from July 24, 1969, through Dec. 31,
1974), the provision was then extended for one year to cover all expenditures made
during 1975. Pub. L. 93-625, § 3(c), 88 Stat. 2108 (1975). Because § 167(k) was duetoexpire
on Dec. 31, 1974, Congress had previously added a rider to Pub. L. No. 93-482; 88 Stat.
1456 (1974), extending § 167(k) to cover rehabilitation expenditures incurred after Dec.
31, 1974 and before Jan. 1, 1978 if the expenditures were incurred pursuant to a binding
contract entered into before Dec. 31, 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-482 § 4. Because the
extension was itself enacted on Oct. 26, 1974, builders and developers had little time to
execute the required contracts. The provision in Pub. L. No. 93-625, 88 Stat. 2108
(1975), enacted on Jan. 3, 1975, extended § 167(k) to cover expenditures made during
1975 by substituting the date "January 1, 1976" for "January 1, 1975," a seeming
reference to the language in the original statute. This enactment apparently superseded
Pub. L. No. 93-482 § 4, 88 Stat. 1456 (1974). The most recent extension was made to
allow § 167(k) treatment for all rehabilitation expendiures incurred prior to Jan. 1, 1979.
Pub. L. No. 95-171, § 4(a), 91 Stat. 1355 (1977).
3. The Ways and Means Committee Report stated: "Your committee also recog-
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cheaper and faster than new construction and also more likely to
preserve the character of neighborhoods. 4 In an effort to avoid the
major dislocations which have followed large scale urban renewal and
new construction in the past, section 167(k) requires that once housing
is rehabilitated it be made available again to low-income families.
Since its original enactment, section 167(k) has had a troubled
career. The section was originally enacted for a five-year period.
Theoretically, this limited life permitted Congress to reevaluate its
effectiveness and cost at the end of its term, just as Congress would
with a direct subsidy appropriation. Practically, however, lack of perma-
nence created uncertainty among developers over whether the tax
benefits would continue. Uncertainty and confusion also resulted from
the fact that final regulations interpreting and clarifying major ambi-
guities in the statute were not published until 1972, three years into the
program. 5 In addition, almost from the start, the section 167(k) pro-
gram was the subject of wide-scale attack by those who saw it as
overly generous, wasteful, and inequitable. 6 Despite these problems,
section 167(k) experienced initial success in stimulating a rehabilita-
tion industry.7 In January, 1973, however, the program was dealt a
nizes the importance of rehabilitation of buildings for low cost rental housing." H.R.
REP. No. 413 (Part I), 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 167 (1969).
4. See Rehabilitation Projects and Middle and Low Income Housing: A Panel
Discussion, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. FED. TAX 1159, 1168-69 (1971).
5. 1972-1 C.B. 82.
6. See, e.g., S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 241-46 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as PATHWAYS]; Meir, Tax Shelters and Real Estate: The Rehabilitation of Low Income
Housing, 7 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1972); Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The
Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Government
Assistance, 84 HARv. L. REV. 352, 399-408 (1971); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device
for Implementing Governmental Policy: A Comparison with Direct Governmental Expen-
ditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705,721 (1970); Note, The Value of Tax Incentives as a Means
of Encouraging the Rehabilitation of Low Income Housing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 151
(1972). See also Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 91st Cong.,
Ist Sess. 4903 (1969) (statement of Prof. Charles Davenport); Hearings on H.R.
13270, Before the Senate Finance Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (statement of
Prof. Stanley Surrey), reprinted in W. HELLMUTH & 0. OLDMAN, TA POLICY AND TAX
REFORM: 1961-1969, at 669, 682 (1973). Professor Surrey was perhaps its major antagon-
ist. He argued that the social goals involved could be better served through a direct
governmental subsidy. He referred to the § 167(k) program as "one of the worst
proposals made by the Treasury" and "a splendid example of all that is wrong in using a
tax expenditure to meet a social problem." PATHWAYS, supra at 241.
7. In 1972 the Department of Housing and Urban Development commissioned
Touche Ross & Co., an independent accounting firm, to undertake a broad evaluation of
the operation of the § 167(k) program. The study was completed in 1974 and a report
submitted. It showed that despite substantial obstacles, the § 167(k) program had suc-
ceeded in creating a "rehab industry" which had produced more than 60,000 re-
habilitated housing units between 1969 and 1973. I THE IMPACT AND EFFECTS OF SECTION
167(K) ON THE REHABILITATION OF MULTIFAMILY PROPERTY 108 (1974) (unpublished
report to HUD by Touche Ross & Co., in two volumes) [hereinafter cited as TOUCHE
Ross STUDY].
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major blow when the Nixon administration imposed a broad and
immediate moratorium on all HUD subsidized housing programs. 8 The
effect of the moratorium, together with the continuous criticism and
the impending expiration of the section 167(k) program on December
31, 1974, had a devastating impact on investment in low-income
housing rehabilitation projects. For two years, rehabilitated housing
reservations fell off dramatically, 9 and the fact that the program was
subsequently extended by Congress did little to curb this trend.10
Recently, however, several factors have combined to breathe new
life into the section 167(k) program. In the Tax Reform Act of 1976,11
Congress again extended the tax benefits available under section
167(k), while at the same time substantially restricting those available
to other kinds of investments. 12 This has led to renewed investor
interest in section 167(k) tax shelters. 13 In addition, HUD may be
taking a more positive approach to the housing subsidy programs in
general and rehabilitated housing in particular. In its latest budget
figures, HUD has projected there will be 25,000 subsidized re-
habilitated housing starts in 1978 compared with 10,000 in 1977.14
8. 31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 40 (Jan. 13, 1973). This precipitous cutoff of funds
came at a particularly ill-timed moment for the § 167(k) program, since final regulations,
which interpreted the section, had only just been published in 1972. 1972-1 C.B. 82.
9. In 1972, HUD reservations for rehabilitated housing units were by program:
Rent Supplement: 1,638; Section 235: 4,284; Section 236: 14,270. DEPARTMENT OF HoUS-
ING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, JUSTIFICATION FOR 1972 ESTIMATES (Part 1), E-l, Table
VI (1971). In 1973, reservations dropped to the following levels: Rent Supplement: 448;
Section 235: 2,598; Section 236: 5,082. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEvEL-
OPMENT, JUSTIFICATION FOR 1973 ESTIMATES (Part 1) B-23, Table VI (1972). In 1974,
reservation levels were: Rent Supplement: 520; Section 235: 1,585; Section 236: 1,510.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, JUSTIFICATION FOR 1974 Esn-
MATES (Part 1) B-33, Table VII (1973).
10. See DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, JUSTIFICATION FOR
1975 ESTIMATES (Part 1) B-23, Table VI (1975).
11. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
12. The "at risk" limitations imposed on nonrecourse financing in oil and gas,
equipment leasing, movie production, and farming by I.R.C. § 465 were specifically not
made applicable to real estate. I.R.C. § 704(d). In addition, amortization of construction
period interest and taxes, applicable to investments in commercial real estate after 1975
and to residential real estate after 1977, were deferred for low-income residential housing
investments (both new construction and rehabilitation) until after 1981. Id. § 189(b).
Recapture rules also gave more favored treatment to low-income housing investments,
including § 167(k) projects. Id. § 1250. Under the 1976 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No.
94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976), all "additional depreciation" on real estate was subject to
full recapture with the exception of four categories of low-income housing (including
§ 167(k) expenditures) which were entitled to a decreasing percentage of recapture after
the property had been held for 100 full months. Id. § 1250(a)(l)(B).
13. See Ross, Syndication Moderation Urged as Values Zoom; Subsidy Projects Sell
Up to 30W of Mortgages, Multi-Housing News, August 1977, at 30, col. 1.
14. Id.
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In view of these developments, it now appears that the section
167(k) program may again contribute substantially to the development
of low-income housing rehabilitation projects. This article will ex-
amine the operation of section 167(k), and also evaluate the direct
subsidy alternative recommended by the opponents pf section 167(k).
It concludes that despite its shortcomings, the tax incentive approach
of section 167(k) remains the more effective way to stimulate the
rehabilitation of low-income rental housing.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TAX SUBSIDY APPROACH
TO HOUSING REHABILITATION
Prior to 1969, there was neither a cohesive nor an extensive
rehabilitation industry in the United States.15 Several factors contribut-
ed to a preference for new construction over rehabilitation among
builders and developers. First, in major rehabilitation it is often dif-
ficult to estimate how much will have to be replaced until the project
has been acquired and "gutting" operations commenced. It is fre-
quently impossible, for example, to know what is behind the walls or
the overall condition of plumbing, wiring, and structural components
of the building, until many investment dollars have been committed. 16
Also, every rehabilitation property is to some extent unique, requiring
particularly skilled construction trades to do the job. 17 These factors
combine to make cost projections difficult, and the probability of cost
overruns great. 18
In addition to construction problems, builders shied away from
rehabilitation jobs because properties tended to be smaller, negating
economies of scale. 19 Moreover, rehabilitation properties tended to be
located in declining neighborhoods with their attendant problems of
crime and vandalism; and unless the entire neighborhood was undergo-
ing rehabilitation, the finished product often faced a risky market. As a
result, the chances of an adequate investment return were uncertain. 20
Despite the reluctance of developers to undertake major inner city
rehabilitation, there has never been much dispute that such rehabilita-
tion is socially desirable. First, it carries the possibilities of revitalizing
the tax base and contributing to the preservation and upward mobility
15. See I TOUCHE Ross STUDY, supra note 7, at 8.
16. See THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING: A DE-
CENT HOME 108 (1968) [hereinafter cited as A DECENT HOME].
17. Id. at 108.
18. See generally Note, supra note 6; Schaaf, The Government Isn't Doing Enough
for Rehabilitated Housing, I REAL EsT. REV. 28 (1971); Weinstein, How to be a Success-
ful Rehabber, 4 REAL EST. REV. 88 (1974).
19. See A DECENT HOME, supra note 16, at 108.
20. Id. at 98, 104-10.
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of neighborhoods.21 Second, rehabilitation generally avoids the mas-
sive dislocations of families and businesses which necessarily accom-
pany large-scale urban renewal. 22
Third, rehabilitation takes optimum advantage of the previous
investments in capital improvements-roads, sidewalks, gas mains,
water and sewer systems, and even schools, playgrounds, and parks. 23
By 1969, it was apparent that some form of subsidy would be
needed to stimulate a major inner city rehabilitation program. 24 This
was particularly plain if the finished product was to be rented at prices
affordable by low-income families, because such rents could never
support the costs of the rehabilitating operation and provide a competi-
tive return to the developer. 25
The enactment into law of section 167(k) invited developers and
investors to take on the risks of major rehabilitation in the inner cities.
The price offered to entice developers into the low-income rehabilita-
tion field was a tax subsidy-a dramatic five-year writeoff of the
rehabilitation expenditures. 26 The developer could utilize the deduc-
tions himself, to shelter his own income from tax, or he could profit
from selling them to wealthy investors, in the form of limited partner-
ship shares. 27
A. The Legislative Policy Underpinnings of Section 167(k)
Discussion of low-income housing rehabilitation in general or
section 167(k) in particular is minimal in the testimony before the tax
committees in Congress and in the reports accompanying the 1969
Act, and the exact origin of section 167(k) is not altogether clear. 28
Section 167(k)'s enactment in the 1969 Tax Reform Act is, moreover,
21. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UR-
BAN PROBLEMS TO THE CONGRESS AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 159
(1968) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY].
22. Indeed, it has not been infrequent that once land is cleared for urban renewal, it
stands vacant for long periods of time before an adequate plan for redevelopment can be
formulated and approved. Moreover, even when redevelopment comes, it often takes
the form of luxury highrises and accompanying services, thereby effecting a permanent
removal of families from their neighborhoods. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1977, at 37, col.
I.
23. See generally A Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 1169.
24. See A DECENT HOME, supra note 16, at 102-04.
25. Id.
26. I.R.C. § 167(k).
27. See notes 57-60 infra and accompanying text.
28. It has been speculated that it originated in the Committee on Ways and Means.
Note, Accelerated Depreciation for Housing Rehabilitation, 79 YALE L.J. 961, 965 n.13
(1970). Two heralded Presidential Commission Reports on the nation's housing prob-
lems, A DECENT HOME, supra note 16, and BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note
21, which had been published in late 1968 stressing the need for rehabilitating the
country's inner city housing, may have played a role in the development of the section.
[Vol. 28:682
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striking in view of the general purpose of the Act to restrict the use of
real estate investments as tax shelters.29 Whatever the source of the
provision, Congress did express its clear intent that the provision was
aimed at stimulating builders and developers to take on the heretofore
uneconomical job of revitalizing inner city low-income housing and
creating a strong "rehab industry."
In the House Report accompanying the 1969 Act, the Ways and
Means Committee stated:
[T]he Congress [in the 1968 Housing Act] expressed its
desire to stimulate construction in low- and middle-income
housing to eliminate the shortage in this area. However, the
present tax treatment of real estate does not efficiently
stimulate investment in low- and middle-income housing.
In the housing field the tax stimuli are more effective for
luxury- and moderate-income rental housing where profita-
bility and appreciation prospects relative to risk are inher-
ently more attractive than in lower income housing.
The "trickle down" supply effect for the lower income
rental housing market is slow and uncertain in a growing
general housing market.
Capital and other resource demands engendered by the
existing tax stimuli tend to expand luxury housing, commer-
cial, office, motel, shopping center, and other forms of in-
vestment, squeezing out lower income housing.
The tax benefits are not focused on new construction but
are spread over repeated turnover of older properties; this
may support the market and prices for older housing, but the
beneficial feedback to new construction incentive is not pro-
portionate to the revenue cost.
Also, just a year before Congress had enacted the Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified in scattered sections of 17 & 42
U.S.C. (1970)), which created major new housing subsidy programs to assist low- and
moderate-income families. This too may have provided an impetus to the enactment of
§ 167(k). See Krooth & Spragens, The Interest Assistance Programs-A Successful
Approach to Housing Problems, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789 (1971).
29. As finally enacted into law, the 1969 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83
Stat. 487, lengthened the holding period necessary for avoiding recapture treatment in
new residential rental property, I.R.C. § 1250(a)(2)(B)(iii), and eliminated the avoidance
of recapture altogether for commercial or used residential rental property. Id. §
1250(a)(2)(B)(v). The Act also reduced the available rate of depreciation from 200% to
150% declining balance for new commercial real estate, id. § 167(j)(1), and from 150%
declining balance to straight line for used commercial real estate, id. § 167(j)(4). The rate
available for used residential real estate was reduced from 150% to 125% declining
balance. Id. § 167(i)(2), (5). In addition, Congress added a minimum tax provision, id. §
56, which imposed a special tax on tax preference items, and accelerated depreciation on
real property was included as an item of tax preference. Id. § 57(a)(2).
Against this background, the passage of § 167(k) must be viewed as a dramatic
departure.
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The present treatment creates a tax environment favor-
able to frequent turnover which tends to discourage long-
range "stewardship" and adequate maintenance; it also en-
courages thin equities and unsound financial structures
which could topple if the market for real estate and rental
housing weakened.
The tax stimuli aid new construction more than im-
provements or remodeling of existing housing since it ap-
pears that remodeling of risky low-income projects cannot
be conventionally financed as well as new housing.
Accordingly, your committee has concluded that the cur-
rent tax incentive aspects of real estate depreciation should
be reduced, except as to new residential rental housing. In
addition, rehabilitation expenditures of low-cost rental hous-
ing are to be permitted to be written off over 60 months.
Also, the present phase-out of recapture of excess deprecia-
tion over straight-line is to be ended. 30
B. The Statutory Requirements of Section 167(k)
In order to depreciate rehabilitation expenditures over a five-year
period under section 167(k), a taxpayer must make qualified "rehabili-
tation expenditures" 31 of at least $3,000 per unit (to a maximum of
$20,000 per unit) over a period of two consecutive years.3 2 Amounts in
excess of the $20,000 maximum are not eligible for the five-year
writeoff and must be treated under depreciation methods otherwise
permitted. 33 The minimum and maximum expenditure levels are ap-
parently intended to insure that the rehabilitation will involve substan-
tially more than minor redecorating costs while at the same time
precluding use of the tax benefit for luxury-type improvements. 34
30. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 166, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1818-19. See also S. REP. No. 522, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
212-13, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2247-48.
31. Not every payment made in the acquisition and renovation of a § 167(k) project
will qualify as a "rehabilitation expenditure." That term is specifically defined in the
statute as "amounts chargeable to capital account and incurred for property or additions
or improvements to property (or related facilities) with a useful life of five years or more,
in connection with the rehabilitation of an existing building for low-income rental
housing." I.R.C. § 167(k)(3)(A). The statute goes on to provide that acquisition costs of
the building, or any interest therein (for example, the cost of buying out an existing lease)
will not be considered rehabilitation expenditures. Id. There is no requirement, how-
ever, that the building had been used for residential purposes prior to being rehabilitated.
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(k)-3(c)(1) (1972).
32. I.R.C. § 167(k)(2)(A), (B).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(k)-1(b)(2) (1972).
34. See Note, supra note 28, at 964 n.10. However, the expenditure limits have also
been criticized because the developer might use the maximum limit permitted as an
excuse to spend that much: the greater the expenses the greater the tax benefits. I
TOUCHE Ross STUDY, supra note 7, at 33.
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The rehabilitation expenditures must relate to "dwelling units,"
which "does not include a unit in a hotel, motel, inn, or other
establishment more than one-half of the units in which are used on a
transient basis.' "35 In some cases, where extensive reconstruction work
is undertaken, it may be hard to distinguish between what is rehabilita-
tion and what should more properly be classified as new construction.
This may be a particularly difficult problem in a building not previous-
ly used for residential purposes. The regulations have attempted to
clarify this area and provide workable guidelines. 36 Though conceding
that in close cases the determination will be made "upon the basis of
all the facts and circumstances," 37 the regulations use as a rule of
thumb that where the foundation and outer walls are retained, the
expenditures will generally be considered rehabilitation. 38 If the inter-
nal structure and one or more outer walls are removed, the expendi-
tures will generally be viewed as new construction. 39
Similarly, expenditures attributable to the enlargement of the total
area occupied by the dwelling units will be considered new construc-
tion, and thus not qualify for the five-year writeoff.40 But enlargement
apparently does not mean that the total number of units in the structure
cannot be increased.41 In addition, where the developer expends funds,
for example, to pave ground outside the building for a parking lot for
the tenants, the amount expended may qualify as rehabilitation expen-
ditures even though outside the basic structure.42
35. I.R.C. § 167(k)(3)(C).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(k)-3 (1972).
37. Id. § 1.167(k)-3(a)(2).
38. Id.
39. Id. Other factors used to make this determination are the amount paid to acquire
the existing building and the amount of material remaining from the existing building. Id.
40. Id. § 1.167(k)-3(a)(3).
41. See id. § 1.167(k)-3(a)(4).
42. Id. § 1.167(k)-3(a)(3). The regulations provide the following examples to illus-
trate the definition of rehabilitation expenditures:
Example 1: The taxpayer owns a two-story apartment building with an empty
attic, which he plans to rehabilitate. In addition to rehabilitating the existing
units, he constructs two new apartments in the space formerly occupied by the
attic. The expenditures may qualify as rehabilitation expenditures. However, if
the taxpayer adds a third story to the building, the expenditures for the third
story do not qualify as rehabilitation expenditures.
Example 2: The taxpayer owns an apartment building. In addition to rehabilitat-
ing the existing structure, the taxpayer adds a new wing to the building occupied
by dwelling units. The expenditures attributable to the new wing do not qualify
as rehabilitation expenditures.
Example 3: The taxpayer owns an apartment building. As part of the rehabilita-
tion of the existing structure, the taxpayer constructs a garage for the use of
tenants. The expenditures attributable to the garage may qualify as rehabilita-
tion expenditures. If the garage is used by tenants of dwelling units and other
persons, an allocation of expenditures will be made.
Id. § 1.167(k)-3(a)(4).
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Once the rehabilitation is completed, the units for which the fast
writeoff was claimed must have been used for "low-income rental
housing." The statute initially defined "low-income" with general
reference to "the policies of the Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1968'" 3 which was implemented by regulation in 1972. 44 This
definition was criticized because it did not correspond to any other
definition used in federal housing programs, 45 and in the 1976 Tax
Reform Act Congress changed the statute so that "Low-Income Rental
Housing" as used in section 167(k) now corresponds with HUD's
current housing subsidy program, 46 known generally as the "section 8
program. 4
7
Under the language of section 167(k), the depreciation deduction is
limited to rehabilitation expenditures "paid or incurred by the taxpay-
er.''48 Although later clarified in the regulations, this language was
initially troublesome because it is significantly different from the
provisions permitting accelerated depreciation on other forms of real
estate investment which requires only that "the original use of...
[the property] commences with the taxpayer. "49 Finally, if a taxpayer
Where a developer rehabilitates a building and in addition to working on the individ-
ual units, also incurs expenditures for common areas such as hallways or lobbies, or for
general expenditures attributable to more than one unit, as for electrical wiring or
plumbing, he must allocate the cost of these expenditures to particular units. Id.
§ 1. 167(k)-2(d)(1) (1972). This is done in order to compute the maximum and minimum
limits on rehabilitation expenditures. In addition, if one or more units in the building are
rented for a nonqualifying purpose, such as for a commercial unit, or to a family which
does not meet the applicable income limits, that portion of the general expenditures
which are attributable to such unit or units will be disqualified for the five-year writeoff
under § 167(k). The allocation of common rehabilitation expenses to each qualifying unit
is made in the same ratio the area of such unit bears to the total area of all dwelling units
to which the rehab expenditures are attributable. Id. But if the taxpayer can demonstrate
the actual amount of expenditures paid or incurred with respect to a particular dwelling
unit, then the allocation rules shall not apply. Id.
43. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 521(a), 83 Stat. 649 (1969).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(k)-3(b)(2)(i) (1972).
45. See Lane, Final Regs on Depreciation and Rehabilitation of Residential Property
Clarify Many Areas, 37 J. TAX. 18, 22 (1972).
46. I.R.C. § 167(k)(3)(B) provides:
The term "low-income rental housing" means any building the dwelling units in
which are held for occupancy on a rental basis by families and individuals of
low or moderate income, as determined by the Secretary in a manner consistent
with the Leased Housing Program under Section 8 of the United States Housing
Act of 1937 pursuant to regulations prescribed under this subsection.
Conflicting proposed regulations were published in the Federal Register on May 8, 1978.
See 43 Fed. Reg. 19,679 (1978).
47. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat.
633 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1975)). See text accompanying
notes 88-97 infra.
48. I.R.C. § 167(k)(2)(A), (B).
49. E.g., id. § 167(j)(2)(A)(ii). It was initially unclear whether a purchaser of
rehabilitated property could claim a § 167(k) deduction if he had bought the property
after the rehabilitation but prior to occupancy. See A Panel Discussion, supra, note 4, at
690 [Vol. 28:682
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seeks to write off rehabilitation expenses under section 167(k) he must
file both the appropriate election in the first year, 50 as well as an
information statement in subsequent years. 51 In addition, the statute
requires income certification of the taxpayer's tenants. 52 If a dwelling
unit for any reason fails to meet all the statutory requirements for
section 167(k) treatment, the taxpayer's election for that unit is auto-
matically revoked. 53 Revocation of the election for one unit, however,
will not affect the tax treatment for the remaining qualifying units .54
The revocation is prospective only. 55 However, once an election is
revoked, it may not be reinstated.56
C. Financing the Section 167(k) Project: The Limited Partnership
1. Entity and Tax Structure
Once a decision is made to undertake a section 167(k) project, a
development plan must be devised-a critical consideration being that
adequate financing must be obtained. The vehicle typically used to
develop and own the project is the limited partnership, with the
developer as general partner and passive investors as the limited
partners. The limited partnership is undoubtedly the most popular form
of syndication because it "combine[s] the tax advantage of a noncor-
porate form with the nontax corporate characteristics of limited liabili-
ty and centralization of management. " 57 The tax advantage is that a
partnership is not a taxable entity. 58 Since it is not, the losses incurred
by the entity are passed through to the partners, each of whom may
1182-83. The problem was resolved in favor of such purchasers, however, by the 1972
final regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.167(k)-l(b)(l) (1972).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(k)-4(a)(1) (1972).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 1.167(k)-3(b)(4). If the same tenant continues to live in the unit over the
writeoff period, the initial certification statement is given for the last taxable year of
the tenant prior to the year the dwelling unit is placed in service or the tenant first
occupies such unit. Id. § 1.167(k)-3(b)(3). If the same tenant continues to live in the
unit over the writeoff period, the initial certification statement will control, even if
the tenant's income increases beyond the income limits. Id. § 1.167(k)-3(b)(5). This
avoids the problem of a landlord having to evict a tenant solely for tax reasons.
However, if the dwelling unit is rented to a new tenant or subleased within the five-year
writeoff period, new income certification statements must be obtained from each new
tenant. Id. § 1.167(k)-3(b)(4). The regulations specifically provide that occupants of a
dwelling unit will not qualify as low-income tenants if all are unmarried students. Id. §
1. 167(k)-3(b)(2)(ii).
53. Id. § 1.167(k)-4(d)(2).
54. Id. § 1.167(k)-4(d)(1), (2)(i).
55. Id. § 1.167(k)-4(d)(1), (2).
56. Id.
57. Gabinet & Coffey, Housing Partnerships: Shelters from Taxes and Shelters for
People, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 723, 735 (1969) (footnote omitted).
58. See I.R.C. § 702(d). The partnership agreement must be drafted carefully to
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offset his share of them against his own personal income. 59 The losses
may be deducted to the extent that they do not exceed each partner's
adjusted basis in his partnership interest,6° which includes the partner's
basis as well as his allocable share of a nonrecourse 61 mortgage. 62
2. The Limited Partnership as the Syndication Vehicle
Although financing a section 167(k) project is a complex process,
it typically follows certain basic patterns. 63 In any real estate devel-
opment transaction, commercial or residential, luxury or low-income,
new construction or rehabilitation, a developer's 64 plan for a particular
piece of property will provide for the financing of the property, the
construction of the improvement, and the ultimate use of the improved
property.
Once the developer has formulated a plan, he needs to obtain
"front money" to implement the plan. The land or property must be
optioned, or purchased, architectural and site planning costs must be
incurred in order to produce plans for approval by local zoning and site
planning commissions, and detailed development plans must be pre-
sented for rentals or sales in order to get financial commitments from
lenders for the development of the property. In addition, the financial
commitments rarely cover one hundred percent of the cost of the
avoid having the partnership viewed as an association under I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3), and
therefore treated as a corporation. See Rev. Proc. 72-13, 72-I C.B. 735. See generally
Gabinet & Coffey, supra note 57, at 734-39.
59. See generally Gabinet & Coffey, supra note 57, at 739-41; Lee, Tax Shelters
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 22 VILL. L. REv. 223, 226-27 (1976-77).
60. I.R.C. § 704(d). Section 722 provides that the adjusted basis of the partner's
interest includes the amount of money contributed as well as the adjusted basis of the
property contributed. Section 752(a) provides that any increase in the partner's liabilities
will be considered an increase in his contribution. Thus, these two provisions taken
together indicate that the basis of the partner's interest is increased insofar as his share
of the liabilities of the partnership increases. Regulations § 1.752-1(e) provides that the
ratio for sharing losses is determinative of the share of liabilities. With a nonrecourse
loan, however, where no partners (including the general partner) have any personal
liability, the partners share the liability proportionally as they share the profits. Shapiro,
Limitations of Losses to Amounts at Risk, in TAX SHELTERS AFTER REFORM 4-5 (R.
Shapiro ed. 1977); Gould, Trends in Tax Planning for Real Estate Investments, 50TAXFs
732, 741-42 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1975).
61. A nonrecourse loan is one in which an investor incurs no personal liability. H.R.
REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1975).
62. Section 752(c) codifies the principle of Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I
(1947).
63. See generally 1 TOUCHE Ross STUDY, supra note 7, at 91-114.
64. The prime mover in the production of improvements on real estate is generally
called a "developer." The developer may or may not be the original landowner, may or
may not be the builder, and may or may not be the owner and operator of the final
improvements. However, the developer is responsible for coordinating all these essential
elements required to produce the final product.
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development of the property, and the developer, who is often under-
capitalized, needs to find investors who will contribute capital to make
up the shortfall from the mortgage financing.
The investor will put up such front money and equity capital only if
the developer's projections indicate a substantial profit, either on the
operation of the improved property or on its later sale, or if the
developer is able to hold out the prospect of substantial tax deductions
during the construction and operating periods to shelter the investor's
high bracket income. 65
In low-income projects, financed under the various housing sub-
sidy programs (either new construction or rehabilitation), cash return
on investment has been limited to a small percent of net equity
contributed. 66 Moreover, the potential for capital appreciation on sale
is not great because (1) the cash return from operating the project is
limited; (2) HUD frequently imposes restrictions against refinanc-
ing; 67 and (3) the "low-income" character of the property is viewed as
undesirable.6" In addition, if an early sale is made, the income tax
recapture rules of section 1250 mean that a major part of the gain may
be taxed at ordinary income rates. 69 Therefore, in low-income pro-
jects, both new construction and rehabilitation, tax shelter has been the
major financial attraction for the investor.7" It follows that the devel-
oper, to sell the project to investors, must be able to project tax
savings. In this respect, section 167(k) is particularly attractive, be-
cause it offers substantially greater tax benefits to the high-income
investor than other real estate ventures, even new construction of low-
income projects. 71
65. This prospect of substantial tax deductions is precisely what the developer can
hold out to the investors by means of the § 167(k) accelerated depreciation allowances.
Because the project is formed as a limited partnership, these deductions would pass
through to the investors in their capacity as limited partners. See notes 57-62 supra and
accompanying text. See generally Calkins & Updegraft, Tax Shelters, 26 TAx LAW. 493
(1973); Gabinet & Coffey, supra note 57; Kanter, Real Estate Tax Shelters: Everything
You Wanted to Know But Did Not Know What to Ask, 51 TAXES 770 (1973); Lane,
The Tax Reform Act of 1976: What it Means for Real Estate Limited Partnerships, 4 J.
REAL EsT. TAX. 195 (1977).
66. Section 236Gj)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(j)(4)(A) (1976). The HUD Section 8
program achieves the same result by the Fair Market Rent limitations imposed. 24
C.F.R. §§ 880.108, 881.108 (1977).
67. 24 C.F.R. §§ 221.21, 221.560, 236.40 (1977).
68. Touche Ross Co. inquired into the reasons for not developing a rehab project.
Tenant characteristics were consistently offered as a major factor. See I TOUCHE Ross
STUDY, supra note 7, at 65, 68, 70, 73.
69. A sale before 16 2/3 years have elapsed since the property was placed in service
will lead to some amount of recapture. I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1)(B)(iii).
70. See I TOUCHE Ross STUDY, supra note 7, at 108.
71. Id.
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The tax benefits available to the real estate investor in low-income
housing projects (both new construction and rehabilitation) include the
deduction (until 1982) of construction period interest and taxes, 72
depreciation deductions based on the full cost of the property (exclud-
ing land) and any improvements made including that part financed
with any nonrecourse loans,73 and deductions for operating expenses
and interest on the permanent mortgage. 74
In addition, the low-income housing investor may be able to obtain
greater leverage than will an investor in a conventionally financed
project. 75 The conventionally financed nonsubsidized real estate pro-
ject will normally have a seventy-five or eighty percent mortgage; a
federally subsidized project to serve low- and moderate-income
families will carry a ninety percent mortgage. 76 Therefore, a propor-
tionately smaller total equity investment will be needed to generate the
tax write-offs. 77
The developer will typically sell between ninety and ninety-five
percent of the partnership interests in profits and losses to the investors
and retain the remainder. 78 In return for their shares the limited part-
ners will put up one hundred percent of the equity requirements of the
project, 79 including various fees to the developer and others.80
Frequently, the investors' payments are spread over the construc-
tion period of the project or longer. This method of payment not only
eases their entry into the partnership, but also improves the yield on
investment because it coordinates the timing of the receipt of the
anticipated tax benefits with the cash actually invested.81 It may also
72. I.R.C. §§ 163, 164. Section 189, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, requires
amortization of construction period interest and taxes with respect to real property held
for business or investment. For low-income housing, the statute applies to construction
period interest and taxes paid or incurred in the tax years beginning after Dec. 31, 1981.
Section 189 will not apply if the taxpayer elects to capitalize the amounts under § 266 as
carrying charges.
73. While the full cost of the improvements are subject to depreciation deductions,
see I.R.C. § 167(a), Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)--(b)(2) (1972), only the rehabilitation expendi-
tures are deductible under § 167(k). See notes 36-42 supra and accompanying text.
Depreciation allowances do not apply to land. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1956).
74. I.R.C. §§ 162, 163.
75. For a general discussion of leverage, see Calkins & Updegraft, supra note 65, at
506-08.
76. See id. at 509.
77. See Robinson, The Syndication of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing-Feder-
al Tax Aspects, 18 PRAC. LAW. 15, 17-18 (1972).
78. 1 TOUCHE Ross STUDY, supra note 7, at 99.
79. The cost of the limited partnership interests is usually calculated as a function of
the mortgage. Id.
80. See id. at 56.
81. See chart accompanying note 93 infra.
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give the limited partners added influence over the general partner
during the construction period.
If a project is successful, investors may expect to receive an
extremely favorable return on their investment. The following example
graphically illustrates the substantial tax benefits accruing to the inves-
tor through the process and indicates the kind of yield that is given
under the tax subsidy approach to the stimulation of inner city housing
rehabilitation.
3. An Illustrative Section 167(k) Tax Shelter Project82
Assume a developer is able to purchase at a cost of $165,000 four
dilapidated inner city apartment buildings of four stories each. The
buildings together contain units ranging in size from one to three
bedrooms. The average monthly rent, prior to purchase, was about
$80 per unit, or a total of $64,320. Operating expenses for the build-
ings were about $46,900 per year. There is no mortgage indebtedness
on the properties. Therefore, the prior owner was netting about
$17,420 per year from the buildings ($64,320 less $46,900).
Assume further than the developer plans to rehabilitate the units so
as to be eligible for section 167(k) treatment and to utilize a FHA-HUD
mortgage insurance program83 to provide the underlying financing.
The developer determines that, because of the deteriorated condition of
the properties, capital improvements to rehabilitate the property will
cost about $1,765,000. Once the rehabilitation is completed, operating
expenses are estimated to increase from the existing $46,900 to about
$183,000 per year. This projected increase in operating expenses is
due to higher property taxes resulting from rehabilitation and also to
the costs of better maintenance, tenant services, and management to
keep up the improvements.
In addition to $1,765,000 for rehabilitation costs, construction
period carrying charges and financing, insurance, and various FHA
fees are included in the HUD financing, 84 Assume finally that the total
estimated replacement cost85 of the project is about $2,855,000.
82. The figures used in this hypothetical are based on an actual project.
83. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-la to 1715z-li (1976); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3931-41 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975).
84. See Form 2264, HUD Handbook 4480.1.
85. In determining the amount of the mortgage eligible for initial endorsement of
mortgage insurance, HUD uses the replacement cost of the project at completion, rather
than fair market value. See id. Prior to construction, HUD's underwriting procedures
estimate what the proposed project's replacement cost will be after completion. See id.
This estimate is then verified when the project is actually completed by a cost certifica-
tion requirement. 24 C.F.R. §§ 207.25, 207.27, 207.28, 221.550, 221.550a (1977). If the
actual costs are less than estimated, the mortgage is reduced before HUD's final
endorsement.
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Having completed the expense analysis, the developer must deter-
mine what amount of project income is necessary to meet these
expenses and debt service charges. Because the project is financed
under a HUD insured multifamily program, ninety percent of the cost 86
or $2,569,500 will be financed through the mortgage (90%X
$2,855,000=$2,569,500). Assume that debt service is fixed at 7'/2
percent 87 and will be amortized over a period of nineteen years and
eleven months. This will require a debt service payment of approxi-
mately $19,000 per month or $228,000 per year. Therefore, debt
service requirements plus operating expenses ($228,000+$183,000)
will necessitate total income of at least $411,000 per year, exclusive of
any profit component.
In order to generate $411,000 of rental income, the average rent for
each unit must be about $550 per month assuming, as is common, a
ninty-three percent occupancy rate. 88
Therefore, for this project to go forward, the developer must be
confident that a monthly rent of $550 per unit can be realized so that
the property can meet its operating costs and avoid foreclosure. Of
course, the problem is that in an inner city neighborhood, it is unlikely
that present residents will have sufficient incomes to afford a $550
monthly rent. Certainly the existing tenants, who are paying an aver-
age rent of $80 per month for the apartments are unlikely to be able to
afford such tremendous increases. Therefore, if the project must be
rented to low-income tenants, it is likely that the project will not be
financially feasible unless it qualifies for some direct assistance to
tenants under a housing subsidy program.
The current program used by HUD for multifamily rental housing
assistance is the so-called HUD "section 8" program, enacted in the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.89 Under this
program HUD contracts with the builder to pay, on behalf of the low-
income tenants of the project, the difference between fifteen to twenty-
five percent of the tenants' income and the published fair market rent
for the unit. 90 For "new construction" and "substantial rehabilita-
tion" projects, HUD will agree in advance with the developer to make
housing assistance payments on behalf of future eligible tenants to
whom the units will be rented. 91
86. 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(4) (1976).
87. This below market interest rate is made possible through a special Government
National Mortgage Association Program. See 12 U.S.C. § 1723e (1976).
88. $550 x (67x 93) x 12 months = $411,246.
89. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(Supp. V 1975)).
90. Id. § 8(c)(3), 88 Stat. 663-64, 42 U.S.C. 1437f(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
91. 24 C.F.R. §§ 881.101-881.229 (1977).
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In this project, the developer has obtained a section 8 commitment
from HUD of about $450,000 per year for a period of 20 years. The
section 8 commitment from HUD thus solves the developer's concern
for the operating feasibility of the project.
But this analysis is only half of the income picture. Now the
developer must be sure that the second ingredient is present-that the
equity and profit requirements of the transaction are sufficient to make
the undertaking financially worthwhile.
It is projected in the cost analysis of the project that the developer
will receive somewhat over $300,000 in building, development, and
management fees which will be payable over a period of years. In the
limited partnership agreement, the developer agrees to maintain a
certain net worth to avoid any challenge to his status as a general
partner.92 The developer also agrees to make interest-free loans to the
partnership repayable out of cash flow to meet operating deficits.
Finally, the developer agrees to manage the project, once rehabilitated,
for six percent of the gross rent receipts.
In addition, a fee will be paid to a professional syndicator for its
services as underwriter in the sale of the limited partnership shares to
investors. The syndicator will be responsible for developing the tax
projections and other necessary documentation and for paying account-
ants' and attorneys' fees involved in the syndication process.
Assume the developer has decided to sell ninety-eight percent of
the project in question to outside investors, retaining two percent for
himself. The asking price for ninety-eight percent of the project is
$450,000, or approximately seventeen percent of the mortgage.
Why would investors pay a total of $450,000 for ninety-eight
percent of a low-income rental project in a poor, inner city neighbor-
hood, where the projected unsubsidized rental income from the project
is plainly inadequate to justify the capital investment in rehabilitating
it, and where, because of the location of the project and the surround-
ing property values, it is unlikely that the capital appreciation to the
property will be commensurate with the investment? The following
analysis traces the investors' projected cash contributions and tax
benefits that will accompany ownership of the project. Note that the
investors' contributions are staged over four years, thereby increasing
the tax benefits available from the property with respect to the amount
invested at any one time:93
92. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 72-1 C.B. 735. See also note 82 supra.
93. See note 82 supra.
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TOTAL TAXABLE ESTIMATED
INVESTMENT ANNUAL INCOME CASH
YEAR CONTRIBUTION (Loss) DISTRIBUTION
Year 1 $ 100,000 $ (121,286) $
Year 2 150,000 (361,050)
Year 3 100,000 (280,879) 5,395
Year 4 100,000 (262,833) 25,395
Year 5 (231,450) 35,395
Year 6 (201,211) 55,395
Year 7 (119,395) 55,395
Sub-totals $ 450,000 $(1,578,104) $ 176,975
Year 8 91,817 55,395
Year 9-22 2,381,842 755,985
Totals $ 450,000 $ 895,555 $ 988,355
It is noteworthy that the profit incentives in the transaction here, at
least in the early years, derive almost exclusively from the tax benefits
offered investors and not from the project's "cash flow." For this
reason there is no need to inflate rental charges to generate a profit.
Accordingly, the rents need generally reflect only the costs of re-
habilitating the apartments to make them safe and livable, and the costs
of maintaining them in that condition. The Fair Market Rent limita-
tions imposed by the HUD section 8 program94 also contribute to this
result. Moreover, because of the ever present threat of recapture of
depreciation if the project is foreclosed, 95 the owners have an im-
portant incentive to keep the project in good repair so that it will be
attractive to tenants, and not to "milk" it by deferring maintenance
funds to profit.
At the same time, as the chart illustrates, the major tax benefits that
have been created under section 167(k) provide the investors with a
generous return on their investment. In this example, the investors are
able to substantially recover their investment in the form of losses as
they contribute equity capital.
The section 167(k) undertaking, of course, carries major and ongo-
ing risks. From the investor's standpoint, the main risks are: (1) that
the project will go into foreclosure, triggering both the recapture rules
of section 1250 as well as loss of investment and future tax benefits;
(2) that the investor's income will fall, making the tax shelter deduc-
tions less valuable; and (3) that once having invested his money, the
94. 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.108, 881.108 (1977).
95. See I.R.C. § 1250.
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investor will not be able to get out for cash. This "locked in" effect is
due to the threat of the penalty of the recapture rules on sale,96 and to
the virtual absence of a market for a limited partnership interest in a
low-income project once most of the tax deductions, and thus much of
the profit, have already been used up. Also, as one of the conditions of
the financing, HUD frequently limits the right to refinance in order to
assure the continued operation of the project for low-income tenants
even if the property should rise in value and be capable of attracting
tenants willing to pay higher rents. 97
D. Limitations of the Tax Subsidy Approach
The major criticism 98 of the tax subsidy approach has always been
that it permits many high bracket taxpayers to offset their incomes with
artificial losses and thereby drastically reduce their tax burdens at the
expense mainly of those taxpayers in the middle and lower brackets. 99
It is also said that because tax subsidies are not in the annual budget,
they conceal the true cost of the program from the Congress and the
public.100 Moreover, it is not at all clear whether section 167(k) needs
96. Id.
97. 24 C.F.R. § 221.21 (1977). Other risks the investor assumes are that the tax laws
may change; that the tax status of the limited partnership or the treatment of various
partnership expenditures may be challenged by the Commissioner; that unanticipated
increases in construction costs, strikes, or other factors may cause construction delays
and increase the cost of rehabilitation beyond anticipated revenues; that upon the
project's completion HUD may find that the project does not conform to the specifica-
tions of the § 8 program or that the project does not meet the requirements for fi-
nal endorsement of the mortgage. See generally Rabinowitz & Berenson, The Failing
Real Estate Investment and the Federal Income Tax, 34 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 357
(1976); Scheff, Recasting and Terminating the Shelter; Getting Out Gracefully, Econom-
ically, and Alive, 29 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1631 (1968).
98. S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TA REFORM 134-38 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
PATHWAYS); Meir, Tax Shelters and Real Estate: The Rehabilitation of Low Income
Housing, 7 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tax Shelters and
Real Estate]; Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary
to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REv.
352, 403-08 (1971); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Governmental
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705,
720-25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as A Comparison]; Note, The Value of Tax Incentives
as a Means of Encouraging the Rehabilitation of Low Income Housing, 41 U. CIN. L.
REV. 151, 153-54 (1972). See also note 6 supra and accompanying text.
99. This is a significant issue. There are many taxpayers earning as much as $100,000
or more per year who pay no income tax. See Comm. on Ways and Means & Comm. on
Finance, U.S. Treas. Dept., Tax Reform Studies & Proposals, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3
at 443-44 (1969).
100. Under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297,
the President's Budget is required to include a list of tax expenditures. See, e.g., SPECIAL
ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1978 for a recent
tax expenditure budget. See generally Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept
and the Budget Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 679 (1976).
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to be so generous-that is whether the same rehabilitation construction
could be stimulated at a lesser cost to the public and to the Treasury by,
for example, extending the writeoff to seven or ten years, or tightening
up recapture treatment.
In addition, though tax subsidies are generally touted over direct
subsidies for their "administrative convenience," in real estate tax
subsidy programs like section 167(k), it is plain that the subsidy
approach of section 167(k) does not avoid the entanglements inherent
in a direct subsidy program. Direct subsidy is required because as seen
above, substantial rehabilitation necessarily results in large rent in-
creases which owners must charge tenants to cover basic operating and
debt service costs. 101 If such rental units are then to be offered to the
same economic group of tenants who were before paying $80 for their
units (as section 167(k) mandates), some housing subsidy will be
necessary to make up the difference. The housing subsidy is necessary
notwithstanding the generous tax subsidies involved in the deal be-
cause the tax subsidy acts only as an incentive for the developer and
investors 10 2 and does not provide the cash flow necessary to discharge
the operating costs of the project. 103
This problem has been compounded because the actual administra-
tion of the program by HUD and IRS has been disjointed and ineffi-
cient, with each agency operating in an insular and highly independent
manner. The result has been that rather than reinforcing the goals of
the program, as could and should be possible, 104 their actions have
frequently been inconsistent or even destructive. The early controversy
over the definition of "low-income" tenants in the original proposed
Treasury Regulations is one example of this absence of coordina-
tion.105 In addition, even in the final regulations, almost all of the
examples deal with projects of less than ten units. 1 06 Though the actual
import of the example may be the same, the use of such examples by
the Treasury indicates an obliviousness to the fact that section 167(k) is
workable for the most part in larger multifamily projects involving
HUD subsidies.
A more recent example of this lack of coordination is found in
Revenue Ruling 76-439.107 In that ruling the Internal Revenue Service
took the position that a proper election under section 167(k) had not
101. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 75-79 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 89-91 supra and accompanying text.
104. See note 126 infra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
106. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(k)-3(a)(4) (1972).
107. 1976-2 C.B. 50.
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been made by a limited partnership because the tenant income certifi-
cations had not been notarized as required in the applicable Treasury
Regulation. 108 The form the taxpayer had used, however, had been the
official HUD income certification form which did not require notariza-
tion, but did attach criminal penalties for false statements or misrepre-
sentations. Nonetheless, the HUD form was rejected for income tax
purposes. 1 9
In addition, there currently appears to be a direct conflict between
the tax regulations for rehabilitation expenditures under section 167(k)
and the housing regulations for substantial rehabilitation under the
HUD section 8 program. 10 A primary goal of the latter is economic
integration of tenants within a single building. Accordingly, section 8
housing regulations state that a preference will be given in processing
applications for section 8 funding to those in which low-income
tenants represent no more than twenty percent of the units to be
rehabilitated. Presumably, if a developer submitted an application
requesting section 8 funding for rehabilitation of rental property which
consisted entirely of low-income rental tenants, his chances for fund-
ing would be slim. Yet under the section 167(k) regulations, that is
exactly what is contemplated. 111 To the extent the developer rehabili-
tates units for tenants that do not qualify under the income limitations,
no five-year writeoff is permitted. In addition, expenditures for
common areas, like parking lots and hallways, will be disallowed to
the extent the project is not devoted entirely to low-income tenants. 112
In effect, the tax regulations provide every incentive against economic
integration. 113
These examples of the absence of coordination are simply illustra-
tive of the insular way in which HUD and the Treasury have approach-
ed the problem of housing rehabilitation. Perhaps they are characterist-
ic of any incentive program where tax subsidies and direct subsidies
exist concurrently, although one would hope otherwise. Obviously if
the program is to succeed in the future, it is critical that these agencies
recognize the need for coordinating their activities in an attempt to deal
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(k)-3(b)(4) (1972).
109. The requirement of a sworn and notarized tenant income certification form was
included in Treasury Regulation I. 167(k)-3(b)(4) even though the IRS was aware of the
certification form being used by the FHA for a similar purpose. Rev. Rul. 76-439, supra
note 107, at 51. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BACKGROUND PAPER, REAL ESTATE
TAx SHELTER SUB3SIDIES AND DIRECT SUBSIDY ALTERNATIVES 62 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as BACKGROUND PAPER].
110. 24 C.F.R. § 881.101 (1977).
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(k)-3(b) (1972).
112. Id. § 1.167(k)-3(a)(3); see text accompanying note 42 supra.
113. 1 TouCHE RosS STUDY, supra note 7, at 33.
1978]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
jointly with the problems of the program and to produce the maximum
amount of rehabilitated housing units.
A final limitation of the section 167(k) tax subsidy approach is that
because of the nature of the financing, it generally is not effective in
encouraging existing owners to "fix up" their properties. It offers
accelerated depreciation deductions as its incentive, not cash flow, and
it is workable only through a complicated network of housing and tax
subsidies.
II. THE ALTERNATIVE: DIRECT SUBSIDY
Under a direct subsidy alternative' 14 to section 167(k), the devel-
oper presumably would be given a grant to undertake the rehabilitation
project. This grant would be competitive with the return he now
receives from the net syndication proceeds. But the cost to the Treas-
ury would arguably be less because of the savings from not paying
syndicators, attorneys, and other "middlemen." The project presum-
ably would be eligible for HUD section 8 assistance to defray operat-
ing costs. The developer would be the sole owner and operator of the
project. In addition, major tax writeoffs deriving from collective own-
ership of the project would be eliminated.
Professor Stanley Surrey has criticized the tax subsidy approach
and described the advantages of a direct subsidy alternative:
The "investor" in this contradictory [tax subsidy] ap-
proach is there only to provide, in a bizarre, round about
way, the dollars that mean to the private developer a profit
above "his costs." But to provide that profit, the Treasury
114. There are a variety of direct subsidy alternatives. Each seeks to provide a direct
and equitable means of assistance to the developer of low- and moderate-income hous-
ing. One variety of course is a lump-sum grant to the developer. An alternative form of
direct subsidy is a refundable investment tax credit which would be available to the
developer. A tax credit would be given equivalent to a percentage of the initial cost of the
building or rehabilitation expenses. If the credit were greater than the taxpayer's tax
liability, the difference would be refunded. A second, very similar form, would be a
nonrefundable tax credit. If the taxpayer had a tax credit in excess of his tax liability, he
would be entitled to carry it over to other years. A third alternative would be an interest
subsidy for the developer. This method provides for lower interest rates on mortgages.
Future expenses are thereby reduced, leading to greater future distributions. Finally, the
current § 8 housing programs could be expanded. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 109,
at xv-xix. These alternatives are not exclusively devoted to just rehabilitation projects
but would be applicable in any subsidy situation. The nature of the project might dictate
choosing one form over another. The direct lump-sum grant will be the form referred to
in the discussion which follows, although many of its general advantages and disadvan-
tages would be applicable to the other forms as well. See A Comparison, supra note 98.
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pays the investor $1 so that he in turn will pay the developer
70 to 75 cents. The obvious question is why perpetuate the
middleman "investor" if the approach is so inefficient,
wasteful, and inequitable? These consequences are inevit-
able under that approach. The developer is selling the tax
benefits to the investor. Since the investor desires to earn a
handsome return on his investment in purchasing those ben-
efits, he will pay the developer an amount considerably less
than the benefits themselves, i.e., considerably less than the
cost to the Treasury. Hence part of that Treasury cost is
automatically siphoned off to the investor and away from the
developer. In addition, part of the remaining amount-the 70
to 75 cents that goes to the developer in the form of the
payment by the investor-must in turn be paid by the devel-
oper to the syndicator who brought the developer and inves-
tor together and to the lawyers and accountants who did the
paper work. This is indeed a real irony, for these payments
are but an added wasteful expense on top of the wasteful
expense of having the investor present at all. The developer
thus receives a net amount of around 65 or 70 cents ...
If private developers require an amount in the range of 15
percent of the mortgage to perform their role in providing
low-income housing, then the question arises why should
HUD not pay them the necessary amount directly? The
entire 15 percent would not even be needed, since the por-
tion presently paid over by the developer in syndication fees,
about 3 percentage points of the 15 percent, would no longer
be required. The direct approach would involve a lower cost
to the Government compared to the present tax expenditure
approach, since the amounts now siphoned off by the inves-
tors and syndicators would be saved. 1" 5
This analysis raises several difficult issues. Assuming, as Professor
Surrey does, that the direct expenditure transaction is identical to the
tax shelter project, except that there are no limited partnerships,
investors, or tax writeoffs, the question arises, what happens if the
project goes into default and is foreclosed? Under the section 167(k)
program, if the project is foreclosed, the investors will lose their
investment and must also pay back previously claimed deductions in
the form of section 1250 recapture.
Is the developer under a direct grant program to be permitted to
walk away from a foreclosed project without penalty or repayment
obligation? Obviously, if he can do so it is not fair to say that the
transaction is the same as in the tax subsidy project with simply the
substitution of a direct payment for the syndication proceeds. An
important ingredient, the recapture provisions, has been left out, and
the effect is to remove the major incentive for the owners of the
property to keep it in effective operating condition. Therefore, an
115. PATHWAYS, supra note 98, at 243-44 (footnotes omitted).
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equivalent direct subsidy program must impose some repayment obli-
gation on the developer in the event of foreclosure. This, however,
raises another issue; if the developer is not permitted simply to walk
away from a foreclosed project, the problem arises that he will now be
taking on an additional risk that would normally be borne by the
investors in a syndicated tax shelter transaction. Indeed, the devel-
oper's syndication proceeds are not normally contingent on the pro-
ject's successful operation. Therefore, if the developer, under a direct
subsidy plan, is required to assume the full financial loss if the
property goes into foreclosure at any time over its operating life, it is
not really the same as the present tax incentive program. In addition, it
is predictable that the developer, if required to take on the added risk,
will want a compensating increase in the subsidy so that the direct
payments will likely have to be substantially larger than the sixty-five
to seventy cents projected by Professor Surrey.1 16
There is another troubling aspect of the direct subsidy proposal,
which relates to both the subsidy itself and the added administrative
risks and uncertainties it presents. In undertaking a rehabilitation
project, the developer always has substantial initial expenses. He must
purchase rights in the land, formulate architectural plans, perform
market studies, obtain financing commitments, and perform all the
116. Indeed, in many cases, particularly because the properties are located in poor,
rundown neighborhoods, where many builders have said they were unwilling to build,
much less own, property, see 1 ToucHE Ross STUDY, supra note 7, at 14, 64-72, the
payments may have to exceed "one dollar".
Of course, from the developer's perspective, it is always possible that he could sell or
donate the project, once completed, to a church, community group, or other nonprofit
organization which would operate it for the benefit of the tenants on a nonprofit basis.
But from the standpoint of the program, this would probably prove unacceptable; the
experience HUD has had with nonprofit housing sponsors in the past has been substan-
tially less than satisfactory. Though normally possessing the best of intentions, they do
not have technical expertise or a financial stake in the project's success (since they are
tax exempt, they have no recapture exposure). Perhaps most important, normally they
have no residual sources of capital to meet unanticipated operating deficits. In general,
HUD's experience has been that nonprofit organizations have been the most unsuccess-
ful sponsors of low-income housing projects of any qualified entity. Therefore, such
wholesale transfers of completed rehabilitated projects to tax exempt organizations
(with no recapture liability), is likely to hold unfortunate results for the future of the
program. A 1975 HUD staff study concluded that the three factors most commonly
associated with the default problem were: "nonprofit sponsors, rehab projects, and
location of projects in low income neighborhoods." HUD STAFF STUDY, CAUSES OF
MULTI-FAMILY DEFAULTS at C-14 (1975). The Study also stated:
If a project got into financial difficulty, especially prior to final endorse-
ment, non profit sponsors did not have that small amount of extra capital that
meant the difference between success and failure. In some cases sponsors did
not understand the limits of government support; they believed that if they
needed additional capital, the government would always be there. A number of
non profit sponsors tried to manage their own projects. Their inexperience
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many tasks necessary to ready a project for an initial closing. 117
Normally, it is only after this ground work has been done that investors
are brought in. Presumably (although the proposals do not specifically
so state) under a direct subsidy alternative, it would be at the same
point in time that the developer would be eligible to apply for a direct
subsidy.
But in any direct subsidy program, there always exists the possibil-
ity that the developer's subsidy application will be turned down or only
partially funded. This may occur for a variety of reasons sometimes
based on substantive aspects of the proposal, but other times for
reasons wholly beyond the developer's control, such as the program
simply running out of funds. Moreover, the addition of the direct
subsidy to finance the rehabilitation does not remove the need to apply
for HUD section 8 funding to offset the expected increase in mainte-
nance and other operational costs. 118 The burden of a second adminis-
trative hurdle in the direct subsidy program may materially increase the
risk that the project will not be adequately funded and the developer
not paid in full for his preparatory work and expenses. Consequently,
many developers may be discouraged from undertaking rehabilitation
work. They simply may not want to expend the time, effort, and
expense required to put a project together with the possibility that two
years later, for one reason or another, when the work is done, the
subsidy will be withheld or only partially granted or that they will have
to fight administrative red tape for an additional year for their money.
For these reasons, it is not at all clear that a direct subsidy is
superior to the present section 167(k) program in terms of promoting
rehabilitation both at a lower cost to the Treasury, and in an efficient
and workable manner. Moreover, even if one assumes that a direct
subsidy will generate an equal amount of rehabilitation construction
without an increase in cost, the special nature of the incentives pro-
vided by section 167(k) may hold certain advantages with respect to
the overall goal of urban housing rehabilitation that would be lost
under the direct subsidy approach.
often created insurmountable difficulties. Church groups often looked upon the
projects they sponsored as a form of charity, kept rents artificially low, and
were willing to overlook rent delinquencies.
Furthermore, area office personnel suggest that non profit sponsors stay
solvent only by deferring expenditures as much as possible and providing
minimum maintenance. In short, the association between non profit sponsor
and default, observed in the statistical analysis, is strongly confirmed by field
observation, and a policy of shifting from non profit to limited dividend spon-
sorship appears to have merit.
Id. at D-3.
117. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
118. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
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III. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE SECTION 167(k) APPROACH
In addition to serving simply as a motivation for development of
low-income rehabilitation projects, it is equally important that any
subsidy program have mechanisms for insuring that the completed
projects will be manageable and economically viable and will not soon
deteriorate into slum properties once the subsidy incentives are gone.
Under the section 167(k) program, which combines tax incentives with
housing subsidies, these mechanisms exist to an extent which cannot
be duplicated by a direct subsidy approach.
Because both a direct subsidy and the present section 167(k)
program envision the use of HUD section 8 housing subsidies,' 19 each
is subject to HUD procedures and requirements designed to ensure the
viability of the project. 120 But the tax laws add several elements to this
package, the most important of which is that they force the recipient of
the subsidy-the investor/owner-to take a continuing interest in the
success or failure of the project. This occurs in two ways: first, the
subsidy depends on the project's financial success. Unlike a direct
subsidy, all of which usually is paid at the outset, the tax subsidy is
given each year in the form of losses as the product (a financially
successful rehabilitated housing project) is delivered. Second, there is
a negative incentive. If the project is foreclosed, the investor will be
faced with recapture of some of the previously claimed tax benefits
121
119. See text accompanying notes 114, 118 (direct subsidy), 88-91, (§ 167(k) program)
supra.
120. In order to qualify for a housing subsidy under the HUD § 8 program de-
velopers are required to submit detailed financial and market information in order that
a proposed project's feasibility may initially be determined. 24 C.F.R. §§ 881.205,
881.207, 881.209 (1977). HUD attempts to insure feasibility by reviewing architectural
information to insure Minimum Property Standards are followed, id. § 881.211; cost
information to assess the developer's dollar estimates for completing the job against
project rents and operating costs, id. § 881.213; and financial requirements needed to
achieve an initial endorsement of the project's mortgage for HUD insurance, id.
§§ 881.205(s), 881.207(b). In addition, the developer is required to supply financial
statements to insure that he has the financial capacity to satisfy closing requirements, id.
§ 881.205(s), and a previous participation statement which reviews his prior HUD
experience id., §§ 881.205(q), 881.209(a)(12).
During the construction phase of the project, HUD also employs various inspection
procedures to insure that the plans and specifications are followed and work is competed
as construction monies are disbursed. Id. § 881.215(d). HUD also makes a final inspec-
tion after construction is completed. Id. § 881.216.
Finally, after final endorsement, HUD's Insured Project Mortgage Division will take
over responsibility for monitoring a project's operation, reviewing the annual operating
and budget reports owners are required to submit.
All of these procedures are intended to insure feasibility and financial success of a
project, and would continue to operate under a direct housing subsidy program.
121. I.R.C. § 1250.
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as well as the loss of his investment. Therefore, unlike the direct
subsidy program, the tax subsidy program operates to tie the investor's
financial interest directly to the economic health of the rehabilitated
low-income project. And in so doing, it provides strong encourage-
ment for the recipient of the subsidy himself to screen the project
carefully before investing and in addition to be concerned about its
success once built.
This concern reflects itself in several ways that are entirely sup-
plementary to HUD's standards and requirements 122 and which create
additional guarantees for a project's ultimate success. In all of its
procedures and requirements, HUD approaches the mortgagor of a
subsidized housing project as a self-contained economic entity. In fact,
however, as illustrated above, the mortgagor is normally composed of
the developer/general partner on the one hand and the investors/limited
partners on the other, with widely different interests and goals. Within
the limited partnership executed by the developer and the investors, the
partners share both the benefits and the risks of the project, though
not equally, and not the same benefits and risks. While the developer
may expect to receive profit from fees he charged to put the project
together, 123 the investors participate to share in the tax losses over the
life of the project 24 and are vitally concerned that construction be
completed in a timely fashion and that the project not go into foreclo-
sure. Consequently, it is not uncommon for the relationship between
the general partner and the limited partners to be structured in such a
way that limits the investors' risks by imposing additional obligations
and guarantee requirements on the general partner.
Typical partnership provisions have taken the form of requiring the
builder to make up any unanticipated construction period deficits or
shortfalls against only a "soft" note from the partnership payable out
of cash flow. 121 In addition, the investors may impose buy-back
requirements on the general partner if no final closing occurs by a
certain date, and they may stage investor payments over the construc-
tion period. Some have even required the general partner to place a
percentage of his fee in escrow to defray construction and operating
deficits or to make substantial interest free loans to the partnership to
cover operating deficits, to the extent he has received a fee from the
transaction. 126 Whatever the form of such provisions, the point is that
122. See note 121 supra.
123. I TOUCHE Ross STUDY, supra note 7, at 54, 56.
124. See text accompanying notes 70-77 supra.
125. See Tax Shelters and Real Estate, supra note 98, at 42-44.
126. Id.
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the partnership agreement commonly creates significant additional
incentives and guarantees of performance, together with additional
funding sources over and above those required by HUD, to insure
successful completion and operation. These additional safeguards and
incentives are present only because of the presence of investors and the
availability of tax subsidies. They would not exist under a direct
subsidy program. They substantially add to the chances of the project's
completion and successful operation, and therefore, to the goals of the
section 167(k) program-increased rehabilitation of low-income
housing.
In addition to specific agreements between the developer and
investors, the presence of the investors serves as a critical potential
reserve for additional funds if the project runs into operating difficul-
ties at any time over the course of its life. The investors are available to
contribute this additional capital to the partnership where, after analy-
sis, it is shown to them that the funds sought would avoid the much
greater loss which would occur if the project goes into foreclosure.
Therefore, if they can be persuaded that the supplemental contribution
(together, perhaps, with certain management reforms) would be suffi-
cient to return the project to full debt service status, and if such
additional equity would save the tax writeoffs, it is likely that they
would be willing to contribute additional capital.
The importance of these additional guarantees and funding sources
should not be underestimated. Having additional funding sources to
cover such unanticipated expenses, as well as too rosy projections with
respect to vacancies, nonpayment of rent, vandalism, and general
maintenance costs, could well mean the difference between a re-
habilitated housing project which continues to contribute to the aes-
thetic and social improvement of its neighborhood and one which
slowly returns to its original dilapidated condition.
CONCLUSION
The task of rehabilitating dilapidated inner city housing to make it
safe and livable for the low-income families presently living there is
obviously a monumental one, fraught with difficulty, complexity, and
risk. Because of its unique advantages, the section 167(k) program
seems to offer a better solution to the problem of rehabilitating the
cities' low-income housing stock than a direct subsidy alternative.
Unquestionably, the program is not without its problems. But
notwithstanding these problems, it is clear that the dilemma of enticing
private builders and developers into the rehabilitation field, with all its
attendant problems and risks, is a particularly difficult one. Yet even
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under very difficult circumstances, 127 section 167(k) has achieved
some me.asure of success with respect to this problem, whereas it is not
at all evident that any substitute program could do as well. If the
important social goals involved are to be carried through it would seem
ill-advised, now that the program is only just beginning to operate as it
was originally intended, to discard it in favor of a new and untried
direct subsidy or other alternative program.
127. See notes 5-14 supra and accompanying text.
